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Over the past few years, rising interest in the phenomenon 
of death, as well as in parapsychology and the occult, has made 
it intellectually respectable once again to deal seriously with the 
issue of life-after-death. One aspect of the larger debate which 
warrants careful exploration is the relationship between survival 
and time within the context of Christian theology. But a discus- 
sion on survival will not prove worthwhile if it is conducted, as 
too many such discussions are, loosely and informally, without 
sufficient attention to detail. Both logical and linguistic con- 
siderations are very important. And since talk about life-after- 
death takes many different forms, it is crucial that we distinguish 
among them. 
1. Views of Survival 
We will begin by clarifying various views of survival which 
are held (rightly or wrongly, singly or in combination) by pro- 
fessed Christians. The most prominent of such views may be 
classified under three categories, as follows: 
A. Personal 
1. Immortality of the soul 







In the first category, immortality and resurrection have in com- 
mon the fact that they are concerned with personal survival, 
i.e., the continuation after bodily death of the person (or, at 
least, the essential part of the person), the subject of experiences. 
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These two views1 can be differentiated as follows: Immortality 
(deriving from Greek antecedents) involves a dualistic human 
nature whose incorporeal soul/mind is "freed or "escapes" from 
its corporeal/physical body at death. Resurrection (a  Hebrew 
heritage) maintains a monistic human nature whose mind-body 
ceases to exist at  death and is later "recreated" (though not 
necessarily out of the same "stuff"). In the former case, the soul's 
survival is, so to speak, "automatic" (Christians, however, insist 
that it is still ordained by God) because while soul and body 
interact or influence each other, they remain two separate and 
separable substances. Thus death is conceived as analogous to 
passing through a door from one room into another. In resurrec- 
tion, on the other hand, a person's survival is neither automatic 
nor guaranteed. Death (as non-existence) is the natural end of 
life, and only a special divine act enables life to begin once more, 
since God must make over again the same individual (in an 
appropriate sense of "same"). Both immortality and resurrection 
stress that at least something of us survives death: our personali- 
ties and characters continue, and we are able to have further 
experiences of some sort. 
The four views of survival which I have called "impersonal" 
are alike in not depicting a person as continuing to have experi- 
ences of any kind after death. What those who hold such views 
have in mind is something else: First, in terms of biological 
"immortality," what survives is our genetic material (via sperm 
or ovum) passed on to our offspring. We "live on in our children" 
( and other descendants ) . Second, we also c'survive" by means of 
our influence. Whether this influence turns out to be large or 
small, we do affect other people and indeed the world itself: 
our lives make some difference! Third, we likewise 'live on" 
in the memories of a few fellow human beings. Now, these three 
positions are frequently interwoven, as one might expect. And 
l I  have attempted an exposition of these two positions along with an 
analysis of their strengths and weaknesses in my article "Immortality and 
Resurrection: A Reappraisal," Religion in Life, 43 (Autumn 1974): 312-324. 
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they seem to have an advantage over their counterparts in that 
we know that they actually occur. Yet the type of survival which 
they envision is significantly limited vis-a-vis most other options. 
They are limited in impact and duration as well as by the fact 
that it is not we ourselves who survive. 
The fourth view in my second category, the process view,2 
is similarly impersonal, though rather more permanent. The con- 
cept is that although we do not survive death as experiencing 
subjects, we do survive in God. "Within the process framework 
immortality means that my experiences, intentions, feelings, joy, 
sorrows, goals, and decisions, because they have also been ex- 
perienced fully by a related and perfect God, are retained as they 
were forever in the memory of God? Our lives, then, along 
with the values in them, are preserved intact forever. And they 
will possibly be used by God in his ongoing creative relationship 
with the world. 
The existential view, given as my third major classification, 
appears in many forms,4 but its basic points are fairly standard. 
This view does not deal with life-after-death in terms of that 
period of time following our demise; rather it focuses exclusively 
on the here-and-now. Its advocates insist that eschatological 
language (in fact, all theological language) is a language of self- 
understanding and commitment. In other words, for an individual 
to assert his or her belief in resurrection, immortality, or survival 
of death is roughly equivalent to asserting his or her openness 
to life, to confidence and security, and to decision for authentic 
existence. Perhaps it is not too great an oversimplification to say 
that the existential understanding is primarily one of personal 
psychology. 
*The best summary and evaluation of this position which I know is to be 
found in Tyron Inbody, "Process Theology and Personal Survival," Zli8 Re- 
view, 31 (Spring 1974) : 31-42. 
Zbid., p. 35. 
There are philosophers in this camp like Heidegger, as well as theologians 
such as Tillich (whose approach is more ontological) and Bultmann (whose 
approach is more anthropological). 
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2. "Eternal Life," "Suruiual," and "Time" 
Given the foregoing background information, we can now 
turn to the question of survival's connection with the concept of 
time. But the views as presented here do not appear to have 
suggested anything very problematical or philosophically inter- 
esting about that particular issue.5 The underlying problem sur- 
rounding survival and time can, in my opinion, be best illustrated 
perhaps by reference to the notion of eternal life. 
Use of the Term "Eternal Life" 
The Christian idea of eternal life has a long and distinguished 
history going back to the Bible.6 Those who hold it are usually 
trying to emphasize two points (minimally). First is the pre- 
sumption that meaningful and self-fulfilling survival does not 
come either automatically or inevitably as our "right"; i.e., that 
survival is neither a logical necessity nor a "law of nature." 
Adherents of eternal life insist that survival depends, instead, 
entirely upon the will of God. Second is the assumption that 
life-after-death involves something besides the mere continuance 
of one's human character and personality for a time after bodily 
death. This "something more" is the conviction that what really 
counts is the quality of life rather than its quantity; or, to put 
this in Christian perspective, eternal life has more to do with our 
entering into a special relationship with God ( available anytime ) 
than with the mere extension of our life through time. Insofar as 
these two points are concerned, eternal life is compatible with 
each of the survival views already discussed. 
Nontemporal Survival 
There is, however, a further point that is not advanced by 
every exponent of eternal life, but which is truly divisive. This 
1 must admit to being perplexed about some of the details and implica- 
tions of those positions, along with great apprehension over whether the views 
may be confused or inconsistent. 
We find it in all the gospels-infrequently outside of John, however-and 
in most of the other NT writings as well. 
SURVIVAL AND TIME 391 
additional aspect revolves around an attempt to preclude eternal 
life from continuing on into the hereafter, and springs from the 
supposition that eternal life lies (in some sense) beyond the 
limits of time. 
Nicholas Berdyaev, e.g., has written: "Eternal life is not a 
future life but life in the present, life in the depths of an instant 
of time"? and, more specifically, "There can be no eternity in 
time.'" And George W. Forell, in a popular textbook, echoes the 
same sentiment: 
While the faith in the resurrection has always been a basic 
part of the Protestant Faith, the state between the death of a 
person and his resurrection has been widely and inconclusively 
debated by theologians. T h e  fundamental problem in all these 
discussions is the assumption that time is not only a category 
of the human mind but also a reality in God.  T h e  problem dis- 
appears, however, if one is prepared to take seriously the scrip- 
tural evidence that in God there is no time. . . . 
In line with the biblical witness it appears to be more accurate 
to assert that death means confrontation with the living God. 
Thus man is confronted by eternity at the moment of his death 
and no longer subject to the limitations of human time? 
Eternal life is thereby conceived to be nontemporal. 
Now, whatever one may think about this sort of language 
with respect to God (and we will deal with that topic shortly)- 
i.e., that the concept of time does not apply to Him-one should 
be cognizant of the fact that this nontemporal view requires 
abandonment of the traditional Christian understanding of survi- 
val; namely, it means giving up the concept that the surviving in- 
dividual will continue to have experience~. I confess to having 
great difficulty in grasping the idea of nontemporal survival; 
and while I can see ways of interpreting it, these seem hardly 
satisfactory. 
*Nicholas Berdyaev, T h e  Destiny of Man, 4th ed. (London: Geoffrey Bles, 
1954), pp. 261-262. 
Zbid., p. 252. Author's italics deleted. 
George W. Forell, T h e  Protestant Faith (Englewood Cliffs, N . J . :  Prentice- 
Hall, 1960), pp. 247-248. Emphasis added. 
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For instance, one way of interpreting the remarks about non- 
temporal survival is simply to say that they reflect a basic con- 
fusion and inconsistency. Why? We may consider for a moment 
the oddity of combining Berdyaev's statement quoted earlier 
("There can be no eternity in time") with the following comment, 
also by Berdyaev: "In eternity, in the spiritual world, there 
goes on a struggle for personality, for the realization of God's 
idea. Our natural earthly life is but a moment in the process 
which takes place in the spiritual world."1° But unless I am very 
much mistaken, if events (even spiritual ones) occur in succes- 
sion (as indicated in the last quotation), then they can be 
ordered in a temporal sequence (in opposition to the first 
quotation). And if for some reason they cannot be so ordered, 
then they cannot constitute either a "process" or a "struggle." 
It might well be that such a spiritual time-series would not 
coincide with our own, but to claim (as the nontemporalists 
appear to) that changes occur, though not in time, is just mis- 
leading." 
Another possible way of interpreting the suggestion about non- 
temporal eternal life is to hold that it is not the sort of thing which 
can take place in time, just as a day of the week is not the sort 
of thing which can have weight. This may initially sound 
promising, but I fear that it is not, for we would be making eternal 
life into something which cannot, by its very nature, be linked 
with our ordinary concept of a person. Why? Because the only 
things that can reasonably be called "eternal" in this sense are 
abstractions-abstractions which are not now, never have been, 
and never will be in time. Persons, however, obviously are and 
have been in time; and if they are able to survive death at all, 
it is hard to imagine how they could possibly be removed from 
time. 
Berdyaev, p. 258. 
l1 Change, therefore, implies time. Whether time implies change is, fortu- 
nately, a question which has no bearing on our immediate problem. 
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Dynamic versus Static 
The language of nontemporal survival makes sense if we 
understand that it is associated with something such as the 
existential position (and restricted to that). But if we attempt to 
move beyond this limited perspective, we will be forced to 
choose between a static view of survival "beyond" time and a 
dynamic view of survival "in" time. I am convinced that we 
cannot have both. 
If we opt for a dynamic-i.e., temporal-interpretation of 
survival ( or eternal life), then it is entirely compatible with the 
notion of personal survival as continuing experiences, process, 
change, and struggle. If, on the other hand, we accept a static- 
i.e., nontemporal-interpretation of survival ( or eternal life ), then 
it will turn out to be either incompatible with the concept of 
personal survival (in the previously mentioned sense) or else 
internally inconsistent. 
The situation is simply this: Those who believe in or advocate 
personal survival must reject the nontemporal (static) interpreta- 
tion, and conversely, those who accept the nontemporal (static) 
interpretation must relinquish any hope of personal survival. 
Experiences after death can occur only if they are in some 
sense "in" time. 
God and Time 
Although the problem of God and time is not necessarily 
identical with the problem of human beings and time, it may be 
worthwhile to inquire as to why people have wanted to say that 
in God there is no time. Perhaps along the way we shall discover 
some hint as to the motives of those who seek to remove us from 
time as well. 
For one thing, we certainly want to hold that God is not 
circumscribed by our human temporal limitations. He is "ever- 
lasting" in a sense and on a level different from what we experi- 
ence in this world: He has no beginning and no ending. His 
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existence is independent and necessary, in contrast to the 
dependent and contingent nature of everything else. The Scrip- 
tures are indicative on this: 
Before the mountains were brought forth, 
or ever thou hast formed the earth and the world, 
from everlasting to everlasting thou art God. 
0 . 0 0 .  
For a thousand years in thy sight 
are but as yesterday when it is past, 
or as a watch in the night.12 
God is "timeless" both in comparison with all else (creator versus 
creation) and in terms of a vast difference in God's subjective or 
psychological apprehension of time from our own. 
For another thing, and closely related to the first, is the long- 
standing belief that God created time, and hence cannot really be 
"in" time. Gen 1 tells how God created the heavens and the earth, 
sun and stars, light and darkness-in effect, all those features by 
which people have determined the flow of time. Certainly in 
this sense God is "beyond time, though this does not touch 
every temporal concept. 
A third motive for wanting to separate God from time is the 
close relationship which exists generally between time and 
change, and, more particularly, between time and the twin pro- 
cesses of growth and decay. Many Christians, I believe, are fear- 
ful that placing God in time would inevitably make Him subject 
to corruption. Why? Because if one regards God as already 
perfect, it may be difficult to conceive how He could possibly 
change without becoming less perfect. This same fear appears to 
be behind various attempts at denying that God has any real 
involvement with the world, as well as at denying that He 
responds or reacts to what happens in the world; for to allow 
such experiences might seem tantamount to God's changing 
according to changes in the world (thereby relinquishing absolute 
l a  PS 90:2, 4. Cf. 2 Pet 3:s. 
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perfection and possibly losing complete control of his own 
creation) .I3 
Of these three motivations for removing God from time, only 
the last raises a legitimate philosophical issue (since the others 
are actually making points which are not controversial, though 
they are doing so by stretching language further than its ordinary 
applications). This last claim-that relatedness and even change 
would make God somehow imperfect and "powerless"-is both 
false and without biblical foundation. Unless one adopts the 
mathematical model of perfection, i.e., that to be perfect a 
quality must be extended without limit (to infinity), there is 
no justification for supposing that either relatedness or change 
are equivalent to imperfection." Besides, the language of the OT 
and NT supports the view that God is perfect (in whatever 
sense that term had meaning for those people), and yet He 
experiences, responds, and changes. The "timeless" nature of God 
never breaks loose from its temporal origins in the Bible. And to 
the degree that this discussion bears on the question of personal 
survival, much the same can be said. 
3. Conclusion 
As we have noted, there is a rather wide variety of survival 
concepts-running from the traditional immortality and resurrec- 
tion through process and social to existential. We have also seen 
that time becomes a genuine problem only when there is an 
attempt to join personal survival (thought of as continuing 
experiences) with nontemporality, an effort often cast in the 
language of eternal life. Our examination of this problem has 
shown quite clearly, however, that one cannot literally have 
personal survival of death coupled with real nontemporality. 
l3 The similarity of such reasoning to that of the ancient Greeks and the 
ancient Gnostics is, of course, apparent. 
l4 The influence of Greek philosophy on later Christian thought is no doubt 
responsible for the introduction of this mathematical model of perfection. 
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Paul Tillich, despite his existentialist leanings, was able to 
perceive the need for keeping personal survival closely tied to 
time. First, Tillich argued that the language of life-after-death 
demands self-conscious individualization.15 Second, he contended 
that the language of life-after-death requires time and change: 
Self-consciousness . . . depends on temporal changes both of 
the perceiving subject and of the perceived object in the process 
of self-consciousness. . . . Without time and change in time, sub- 
ject and object would merge into each other; the same would 
perceive the same indefinitely. It would be similar to a state of 
Truly it is worth the effort to understand how survival and 
time fit together, and how they do not. 
%Paul  Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1963): 413-414. 
l6 Zbid., p. 414. 
